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During the last decade the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process has been judicially extended to encompass university dis-
ciplinary proceedings1 which may result in a student's expulsion or
suspension from a public school.2 In general, a student at a public
1. Cases illustrating the reasons for which students have been summarily suspended
or expelled include: Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957) (student
expelled, under catalog regulation permitting such action for appropriate reason, for
protesting the amount of his graduate fellowship); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510,
102 So. 637 (1924) (student suspended under the in loco parentis doctrine for raucous
behavior); Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(student dismissed from a student teaching position, required for his degree, because
he was a "fanatical atheist"); People ex _e. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186
(1866) (student suspended for joining secret society); McClintock v. Lake Forest Univ.,
222 Ill. App. 468 (1921) (student expelled for smoking); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) (student expelled on a few vague rumors of mis-
conduct and for not being a "typical Syracuse girl"); Goldstein v. New York Univ.,
76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902) (student expelled from law school for writing
to a woman in class); Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S.
202 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917) (student expelled for
speech encouraging draft resistance); People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. College,
60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1890), aff'd, 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253, 14 N.Y.S.
490 (1891) (student forbidden to take final examination for undisclosed reasons); Cornette
v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (student suspended for violating driv-
ing regulations and for general misconduct). See also Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due
Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406 (1957); articles cited in note 6 infra.
2. Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961) (students entitled to a due process hearing with notice and statement of
the charges before disciplinary action of expulsion may be taken; such hearing should
include the right of cross-examination and access to testimony against the student);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (due process at the Merchant
Marine Academy only requires a fair hearing, an apprisal of the charges pending,
and an opportunity for defense; counsel is not required); Lai v. Board of Trustees of
E. Carolina Univ., 330 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (university officials, after a
"fundamentally fair proceeding," may use their discretion in disciplinary matters, ab-
sent a showing of bad faith or arbitrariness); Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp.
1200 (D. Kan. 1971) (due process procedure is one fundamentally fair to the student
and calculated to lead to a reliable determination of the issue involved; suspension
reversed pending a hearing with adequate notice, knowledge of the charges, an op-
portunity to defend, and substantial evidence to support the decision); Consejo General
de Estudiantes v. University of Puerto Rico, 325 F. Supp. 453 (D.P.R. 1971) (due process
hearing under disciplinary rules may be held in private if it is fair and offers the
accused an opportunity to appear and defend himself); Bistrick v. University of S.
Carolina, 324 F. Supp. 942 (D.S.C. 1971) (due process requirements at state supported
schools are met by a fair procedure which includes notice, knowledge of the evidence
against the student, an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and a decision
based on substantial evidence); Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1971) (university may make reasonable regulations
if they are sufficiently clear to give adequate notice of the punishable conduct; the
court also listed due process hearing requirements and procedures for such a hearing);
Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (state supported university
may not issue regulations aimed at prior restraint of free speech, nor aimed at re-
stricting the free flow of ideas to members of the university community); Breen v.
Kalil, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (absent a showing which bears the heavy
burden of proving the effects of such conduct on school performance, a school board
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university is now guaranteed notice in writing of the specific charges
against him and of the nature of the evidence on which they are
based; a hearing must be held at which the student may give explana-
tions and present evidence in his behalf; and any disciplinary action
taken must be supported by substantial evidence.3 Constitutional pro-
tection against arbitrary expulsion or suspension, however, extends
only to those actions attributable to the state 4 and is therefore un-
available to students at private universities.5
may not forbid male high school students from wearing long hair, and any such
regulation violates due process); Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis.
1968) (students faced with suspension are entitled to notice of the charges, an op-
portunity to inspect statements against them, the right to the advice of counsel, to
hear the evidence, to be given the names of witnesses, and to have a recorded hearing
as the basis of any decision); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Mo.
1968) (disciplinary actions against students must be based on factual findings sup-
ported by substantial evidence); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1968)
(accused student is entitled to notice and the opportunity to reply as part of a fair
hearing); Zanders v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968)
(students in disciplinary proceedings are entitled to notice, knowledge of adverse testi-
mony, and an opportunity to defend themselves; under these conditions, the adminis-
tration may cxercise discretion, absent a showing of arbitrary action); Jones v. State
Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (university desiring to
discipline students must give them adequate notice and a fair hearing on specific
charges, and decisions must be based on substantial evidence; equal protection guaran-
tees against unreasonable classifications also apply); Esteban v. Central Mo. St. College,
277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (implicit in due process requirements are notice
and an impartial hearing, and accused students should have the right to see opposing
testimony, have the aid of counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and present a defense),
dismissed on the merits, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (university may make and
enforce reasonable regulations, if students are afforded due process hearings, and the
decisions are based on substantial evidence), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.
Tex. 1967) (university required to use due diligence to give students notice of charges,
but actual notice not required if due diligence is used), ajf'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1968); Dickey v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (students'
First Amendment rights protected, and suspension of a student, even following a
hearing, for the peaceful exercise of such rights held unconstitutional); Hammond v.
South Carolina St. College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (university may not issue
regulations which are blanket restrictions on First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and assembly); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961) (due process includes at least the right to notice of the charges and an op-
portunity to defend before suspension attaches).
3. Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Student Discipline in
Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en
banc rules of court), adopted in Farrell v. Joel, supra.
4. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process only for deprivations of property
which are attributable to "state action." See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Black, Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection and California's Proposition
14, 81 HARV. L. Rtv. 69 (1967). The federal courts have interpreted "property" to in-
clude the right to attend college, or to be free from arbitrary and illegal expulsions.
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961) (state university); Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.
N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968) (public high school). These cases establish that public secondary schools and
state universities come under the state action doctrine.
5. Actions of universities not run by the state or funded by state monies, and
which do not hold themselves out as state universities, have been held not to be ac-
tions of the state. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v.
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This lack of judicial protection for students' procedural rights at
private universities has been sharply criticized by both students and
legal commentators,6 but the courts have largely refrained from taking
up the gauntlet and formulating the legal doctrine 7 under which they
could protect students from arbitrary expulsions. This judicial re-
luctance may be due in part to the fact that the commentary has not
been adequate to the task. Much of the literature has merely tested
the rationales commonly used by the courts;8 no fundamental analysis
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753
(4th Cir. 1971); Bright v. Isenbarger, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971); Blackburn v. Fisk
Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969);
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343
F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Brownley v. Gettysburg College, 338 F. Supp. 725 (W.D.
Pa. 1972); Rowe v. Chandler, 332 F. Supp. 336 (D. Kan. 1971); McLeod v. College of
Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598
(D.S.C. 1970); Torres v. Puerto Rico Jr. College, 298 F. Supp. 458 (D.P.R. 1969);
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Greene v.
Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), dismissed as moot, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
But see Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (New York statute
affecting student discipline involved the state in expulsions sub judice); Hammond v.
University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (state's participation in initial funding
of school rendered school an instrumentality of the state at least for purposes of pro-
hibiting racial discrimination); Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp.
45 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (private university's performance of public function of education may
amount to state action when, by failing to keep order, it prevents students from par-
ticipating in the educational process). See also H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1969). The anomaly of giving protection to
public but not private school students is strikingly illustrated by Powe v. Miles, supra,
where Alfred University students, being enrolled in a private university, discovered
they had no procedural rights under the Constitution as the case was argued. Students
at the New York State College of Ceramics, however, located on the same campus
and administered by the same personnel, were guaranteed procedural rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment because the action of their school constituted state action.
Nevertheless, the courts are probably wise in their reluctance to apply full consti-
tutional protection to the private university setting, for application of the enormous
array of duties demanded by the Constitution-only one of which involves due process
-would accomplish too much. Full application might, for example, raise questions
about establishment or free exercise of religion, and might serve to undermine the
advantages of diverse educational experiences which a variety of private universities
can offer.
6. The mass of literature on this subject is collected in Van Alstyne, The Student
as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 612-13 (1968). Particularly significant
articles are: Carrington, Civilizing University Discipline, 69 ,fICH. L. REV. 393 (1971);
Pennypacker, Mandamus to Restore Academic Freedom, 12 VA. L. REV. 645, 652 (1926);
Seavey, supra note 1; Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027
(1969); Note, Private Government on Campus-Judicial Review of University Ex-
pulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963). See generally LAW STUDENT Div. OF THE AM. BAR
ASS'N, MODEL CODE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES & CONDUCT (1969).
7. Those who have tried to formulate the doctrine have focused on attempts to color
state action into the actions of a private university, a fiduciary theory, a critique of
the contract theory, and a critique of the in loco parentis theory. Note, An Overview:
The Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 6, at 1377-87.
8. A recent Note, for example, reexamines the contract theory, and concludes that
a registration form could contain a term permitting the administration to expel a
student summarily which would be enforceable under the law of contracts. Note,
Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253, 267 (1973).
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of the nature of the student's interest and the protection sought has
been forthcoming.9
To guarantee students procedural due process at private as well as
public universities would be quite consistent with the goals of uni-
versity life.' 0 The student accused of cheating on an exam, possessing
drugs, participating in an unruly demonstration, or violating dormi-
tory rules would be given a reasonable chance to establish his inno-
cence, thus promoting the cause of ferreting out the truth." Perhaps
more importantly, due process guarantees would also benefit the
university as a whole by serving to legitimize the exercise of authority
by the administration, 12 thereby fostering a sense of community on
campus which is conducive to an effective educational environment.
In times of a major disturbance or an emotionally charged incident,
the orderly procedures of mandatory due process can temper an ad-
ministrator's impulse to impose rash penalties13 and also provide him
with a shield to fend off cries from outside the university for hasty
retaliation.
9. Chafee begins such an analysis, but his conclusion with regard to private schools
is ultimately inadequate. Thus, his formulation of a law of private associations in-
cludes competing "policy reasons" for determining whether a member should in fact
receive protection in a specific case. While it would seem that the student-university
relationship would satisfy all the tests toward granting judicial protection for students
in expulsion proceedings, Chafee himself is equivocal on the point. Compare Chafee,
The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REV. 993, 1026 (1930),
with id. at 1028. In fact, Chafee concludes his article by saying that whether a member
of an association should receive protection against arbitrary expulsion depends upon
instinctive reactions to the parties in the controversy. See id. at 1029. See Note, judzcial
Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 95, 106-17 (1973) (tests the student-university relationship against Chafee's policy
reasons, and concludes that all the tests toward granting students judicial protection
are satisfied); Note, supra note 6 (tests several rationales used by courts and indicates
that courts should have great freedom within these rationales to protect students' rights).
10. A 1970 survey indicated that most (70 percent) of the colleges that responded
(25 percent of the total number) had formal procedures for disciplinary actions. Better
than half (57 percent) of those who responded indicated that they allowed the ac-
cused to inspect the evidence to be used against him. Project, Procedural Due Process
and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and Practice, 1970 DUKE L.J. 763, 811-18.
See also Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974); LAw STUDENT
Div. OF THE Am. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, §§ 2D-E, at 44-51.
11. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
268 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); Ratner, The Function of
the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1048, 1065 (1968).
12. Ratner, supra note 11, at 1065: "But [fair trial values] also promte expe-
ditious and authoritative decision in order to conserve public and private r'esources,
reduce public and private anxiety, and heal sources of social disaffection."
13. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); D.C. Fed'n of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972);
United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044
(1970); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
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The student has a valuable interest in preserving his status' 4 as a
university student, and expulsion, whether by public or private uni-
versity officials, can have severe consequences which may handicap
the student for the rest of his life.15 Nevertheless, not all interests
which may be deemed valuable receive the protection of the law. The
task is to demonstrate convincingly that the interest claimed merits
protection, not merely in the abstract, but also within the concrete
structure of the developing law.
This Note reexamines the common law precedent on student ex-
pulsions and suspensions and seeks to formulate a comprehensive
doctrinal basis for common law judicial intervention which will re-
alistically protect the procedural rights of public and private univer-
sity students alike. Analysis of the rationales by which we select, among
the values we prize, those which deserve judicial protection provides
the doctrinal basis for determining whether the status of student
merits such protection. Two rationales will emerge which characterize
those interests which have historically been accorded judicial protec-
tion. It is urged that students at a private university have, under these
two rationales, an interest in their status as students which is in the
nature of a property right.16 On the basis of this analysis, the student's
status may then be protected within a category of specific relations
over which the common law has exercised judicial cognizance, the
status of member in a private association.
14. Status is used here not in the mundane sense of social position within a com-
munity, but as a valuable interest derived from a relation with another person or
institution, in this case a university. Professor Reich has pointed out that certain
status interests today are often more valuable than tangible forms of wealth. Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 738 (1964). "Student," in fact, is nothing but
a status.
15. Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 905
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
16. It is not necessary to adopt, or reject, the label of "property" for the valuable
interest analyzed in this Note, the status of student at a private university. If property
is viewed as a legal term encompassing a set of analytically similar interests which receive
a certain form of judicial protection, then those interests of status which are pro-
tected may be considered property. Professor Reich's compelling argument demonstrates
the logical and practical wisdom of viewing certain status interests as property with
regard to constitutional rights. See Reich, supra note 14. Reich suggests himself that
a similar analysis may be necessary to protect other new forms of wealth, such as status
rights in private organizations. Id. at 786; cf. Becker v. Reick, 19 Misc. 2d 104, 188
N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (plaintiff's loss of services of his minor child, though
predicated on negligence, is in the nature of an infringement on a property right).
Indeed, historically the category "property" has been extended from land to include
intangible assets as forms of wealth have changed. See J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CAPITALISM 11-46 (1924). Nevertheless, if property is viewed in a more limited way,
excluding status and relational interests which receive judicial protection, the argu-
ment advanced here is equally persuasive, for it is based on an analysis of the rationales
for protecting any dearly held value, regardless of the legal category into which it
is placed. See Reich, supra note 14, at 739. The substantive basis for the argument,
if not the legal category, is the same in both instances.
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I. The Rationale for Protecting an Interest as Property
One legal institution which protects individual or social values
against arbitrary deprivation by the state or privately held power is
"property."'17 It performs this function, as Professor Reich suggests,
by drawing a circle around the owner: Inside he is supreme, protected
against arbitrary deprivation and unreasonable injury. To speak of
an article of social or personal value as "property," however, is merely
to make the legal conclusion that it is protected; it says nothing, that
is, about what interests should be protected.' 8
Analysis of this more basic issue has received comparatively little
attention from courts and commentators. With the notable exception
of two landmark law journal articles, 19 much legal reasoning has pro-
ceeded simply by rough analogy to precedent.20 Elucidation of the
purposes of property rights in general has been largely historical,
with little development of an underlying rationale and little applica-
tion of any suggested rationale to decisions concerning specific inter-
ests or rights clamoring for similar protection.
Examination of the rationale for protecting any particular dearly
held value as property will provide the basis for a rational evolution
of the law. It will give us a perspective from which we can judge
whether legal protection encompasses the student-university relation-
ship. As social life changes, valuable interests change, and there is
pressure on the law to protect the new ones as well.21 Conceptually,
17. See generally M. COHEN, Property and Sovereignty, in LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER
45, 46-49 (1933); R. ELY, 1 PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DIs-
TRIBUTION OF WEALTH 96-108, 220-21 (1914); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Pound, Survey]; Pound, Interests
of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 344-49, 353-54 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Pound,
Personality].18. Rech, supra note 14, at 739, 771.
19. Id.; Pound, Personality, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (property
right in water level); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(property right in news information); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) (property right in commercial information); United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) (property right in land granted by a former
sovereign); Pearson v. Dodge, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969)
(property right in information); American Ag. Chem. Co. v. Moore, 17 F.2d 196 (M.D.
Ala. 1927) (property interest in commercial expectations); American Washboard Co. v.
Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900) (property interest in trademarks); Stephens
: Co. v. Albers, 81 Colo. 488, 256 P. 15 (1927) (property interest in a captive fox);
Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 38 Am. Dec. 106 (1842) (property interest
in riparian rights); Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333 (1955) (property
interest in buried money); Van Dyke v. Ogden Say. Bank, 48 Utah 606, 615-16, 161
P. 50, 54 (1916) (property right in cancelled checks).
21. Pound, Personality, supra note 17, at 343-44 n.2. In fact, "the history of law
is a record of continually wider recognition and more efficacious securing of social
interests." R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 207 (1921); Pound, Survey, supra
note 17. Nevertheless, the law does not create rights (i.e., recognize new interests)
willy-nilly. To prevent chaos and keep the development of the law rational, courts
are constrained by precedent and operate by analogy.
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the problem for any legal system is to decide which interests to rec-
ognize and secure. An understanding of the principles upon which
this choice is based is necessary if the law is to be rational-that is,
not to include interests which do not comport with the principles
and not to exclude those which do.22 To place the student-university
relationship among those interests which deserve judicial protection,
therefore, will require a fundamental analysis of the nature and pur-
pose of the legal concept of "property," and analogy to related interests
which already receive such protection.
A. Enterprise-Worth and the Student-University Relationship
The gradual freeing of land from the burdens of feudal obligations
to make it available for commercial agriculture is the historical foun-
dation of the modem law of property.2 3 The necessity of vesting indi-
viduals with wealth (i.e., protecting them against arbitrary deprivation)
thus emerges as an integral part of the economic organization of so-
ciety. Shorn of its feudal restraints and vested in individuals, land
became available for use and exploitation for the sole benefit of the
owner.24 As the complexity of economic organization grew, forms of
wealth other than land became similarly exploitable. When it be-
came evident that incorporeal interests such as good will were often
as valuable to the individual, and as essential to economic activity,
as land, physical plant, and assets, the law began to protect such
interests from unreasonable injury under the shield of "property. '" 2
This evolution came to encompass even unrealized interests in the
form of commercial expectations, 26 not because of any fundamental
22. See Pound, Personality, supra note 17.
23. See J. COMMONS, supra note 16, at 47-53; B. MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICrATOR-
SHIP AND DEMOCRACY 4-14 (1966).
24. J. COMMONS, supra note 16, at 61.
25. See generally Pound, Personality, supra note 17, at 349-55; Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
26. The common law has long protected a vast array of status rights involving
economic expectations from unreasonable injury or deprivation under the law of tort.
Examples include the following four torts: 1) inducing breach of contract and in-
terfering with contractual relations, Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E.
817 (1907); Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 73 S.W. 800 (1903) (knowingly in-
ducing a party to violate contract is as wrong as to injure or destroy his property);
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 129, at 932 nn.88, 89 (4th ed. 1971); Green, Relational Interests,
30 ILL. L. REv. 1, 8-15 (1935); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REv.
663 (1923); 2) injurious falsehood, Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963
(N.D. Ga. 1951); Al Raschid v. New Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934); W.
PROSSER, supra, § 128, at 919 nn.49-56; 3) interference with prospective advantage, Deon
v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926) (unwarranted interference with
social opportunities); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 A. 230
(Ch. 1902) (protecting probable expectancies); Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B.
715; W. PROSSER, supra, § 130, at 949-69; Wright, Tort Responsibility for Destruction
of Goodwill, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 298 (1929); 4) interference with employment, Hill Grocery
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change in the nature of property or the rationale for protecting it,
but because of a change in economic reality: What was of little value
before, and of little importance to economic life, assumed enormous
significance later.
The underlying rationale in this development was summarized by
Professor Pound:
Legal recognition of . . . individual claims against the world at
large, legal delimitation and securing of individual interests of
substance is at the foundation of our economic organization of
society. In civilized society men must be able to assume that they
may control, for purposes beneficial to themselves, what they
have discovered and appropriated to their own use, what they have
created by their own labor and what they have acquired under
the existing economic and social order. This is a jural postulate
of civilized society as we know it. The law of property in the
widest sense, including incorporeal property and the growing doc-
trines as to protection of economically advantageous relations,
gives effect to the social want or demand formulated in this
postulate.27
At the root of legal protection, then, is the notion that an economic
system like ours requires confidence 28 that the individual has mastery
Co. v. Carroll, 223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931) (property right in job); Boxill v. Boxill,
201 Misc. 391, 111 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (status of partner requires duty to as-
sociate even if partnership is terminable at will of either partner); McDonald v.
Feldman, 393 Pa. 274, 142 A.2d 1 (1958); Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194,
4 A.2d 886 (1939); Blumrosen, Common Law Limitations on Employer Anti-Union
Conduct: Protection of Employee Interest in Union Activity by Tort Law, 54 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1 (1959); Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 1041 (1935). See also
Howard v. Weissmann, 31 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1929) (union's membership in superior
union protected status); Eschman v. Huebner, 226 111. App. 537 (1922) (damages for
malicious expulsion); Collins v. International Alliance, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 A. 37 (Ch.
1935); Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 A. 692 (App. 1935) (voided
classification in union constitution relegating certain members to junior status); Pitts-
burgh Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505 (1916) (enforcement of con-
ventional status despite express agreements to the contrary); Note, Application of a
Status Concept to Membership Disputes in Labor Unions, 45 YALE L.J. 1494 (1936).
In addition, noncontractual economic expectations are given a more limited protection
against malicious interference. Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1, 15-20
(1935). The similarity between these protected rights and the student-university re-
lationship, of course, is that both involve interests in future economic advantage.
While it is generally stated that one party to a contract cannot bring an action in
tort against the other party for interference with the contractual relationship, if an
agent of one party interferes maliciously then such interference is outside the scope
of his agency and hence is treated as if it were the action of an unrelated party.
See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 6.5, 6.12, at 489-91, 516 (1956). Indeed,
if a university administrator, as an agent of the university, acts maliciously in ex-
pelling a student, i.e., acts in bad faith for a motive not based on the interests of
the university, by analogy this cause of action in tort would directly apply to university
expulsions; cf. cases cited in note 97 infra.
27. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 193 (1922). See Pound,
Survey, supra note 17, at 25, 30-31, 33-36.
28. J. CoLOMNS, supra note 16, at 25.
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over interests considered his own to use as he sees fit, that he can
control the fruits of his labor, and that promises relating to his prop-
erty will not encounter malicious interference. Thus, valuable inter-
ests, even unrealized interests in the form of commercial expectations,
are protected as property when they, as a class, are perceived as im-
portant for rational economic life. If it is perceived that these interests
have substantial enterprise-worth, i.e., that they are valuable to the
individual because of their economic consequences, the law of prop-
erty will protect them against unreasonable injury.29 Some courts
have expressly recognized this premise in cases granting members of
labor unions and professional associations protection against arbitrary
expulsions without fair proceedings. 30
The rationale for protecting against arbitrary deprivation those
interests which have enterprise-worth is clearly applicable to a stu-
dent's relationship with a university. By applying to a university, being
accepted, and continuing to meet certain academic standards, a student
has a status which entails a reasonable expectation of receiving a
degree. That this status has economic consequences today is beyond
doubt. The federal courts have recognized as much in expulsion cases
involving public universities, where there was no question of whether
the students had been deprived of a property right but only of whether
there was sufficient state action involved so that the cases fell within
the Fourteenth Amendment.3.
Social scientists have documented some of the quantifiable economic
consequences of a college or graduate degree. Herman Miller indicates
29. It is to be carefully noted that the law itself does not affirmatively grant or
create "enterprise-worth" interests but only grants legal coercive protection to those
interests once obtained by private citizens. Pound, Personality, supra note 17, at 343-44.
30. See, e.g., Local No. 57, Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 235. 16 So. 2d 705, 712 (1944) (wrongful and malicious interference with valuable
property right, not only as a member of a national organization, but as an individual
seeking to earn a livelihood); Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677,
679-80, 254 P.2d 587, 588-89 (1953) (membership in an unincorporated professional
society . . . is a valuable right, and . . . may not be terminated except by strict ad-
herence to the fundamental requirements of the law . . . expulsion which flouts the
requirements of substantial justice is void and cannot divest petitioner of status as
a member of the Realty Board) (emphasis supplied); Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal. App. 2d
440, 445; 120 P.2d 79, 81 (1941) (right to enjoy whatever advantages membership in
this union would bring them in their calling could not be taken away by the unlawful
action of the general executive board); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill.
App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963) (wrongful expulsion has such serious effects on
ability to earn livelihood that it is judicially protectable); cf. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast
Soc'y of Orthodontists. 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969) (where
membership in orthodontics association is a practical necessity, not only to make a
good living, but to maximize potential and recognition in the field, admission pro-
ceedings must comport with due process).
31. See cases cited in note 4 supra. See generally Anderson v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 99 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972); Galton v. College of Pharm'l
Science, 70 Misc. 2d 12, 332 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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that, on the average, people have received a higher income for every
additional level of schooling in each decade since 1939, without ex-
ception.32 In addition, each degree higher than a B.A. increases in-
come; most higher degrees require a bachelor's as a prerequisite.
Completing any level of education and receiving a degree, further-
more, yields a greater return than simply completing any of the years
leading up to graduation.33 Although he doubts the extent to which
education alone is responsible for these statistics, Christopher Jencks
admits that higher education has predictable benefits both in expec-
tations of higher salaries (an increase of seven percent per year of
college) and higher occupational status.34 Expulsion from a university,
especially insofar as it makes admission to other universities impos-
sible, denies a student access to large numbers of middle class occu-
pations and professions; at the very least, it permanently mars his
record, making competition for graduate school and jobs extremely
difficult. 3; Granting the student's status at a university protection
under the shield of property would prevent such expulsions without
fair proceedings, and would be consistent with the rationale of pro-
tecting as property those valuable interests which have substantial
importance to economic life.36
B. The Prevailing Social Ethic and the Status of Student
The second rationale which determines those dearly held values
which receive judicial protection is suggested by the protection given
to the family unit 37 and, to some extent, to membership in social
32. H. MILLER, RICH MAN, POOR MAN 169 (1971).
33. Id. at 171.
34. C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING
IN AMERICA 181, 222-23 (1972).
35. This was implicitly recognized in a case where the court held that a wrongful
expulsion had to be expunged from the record although the student had been rein-
stated and the college had asked the case to be declared moot. Greene v. Howard Univ.,
412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
36. That the status of student has substantial economic importance which should
be protected is presaged in Greene v, Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir.
1969), where tie court ordered the records of dismissed students expunged before
they would agree to moot the case as the university requested. The students had been
reinstated by the university and some had already graduated, but the court felt that
it should protect the students against the "collateral consequences" of their expulsion,
which was accomplished by forcing the university to eliminate all mention of the
expulsion from their records.
37. Under the law of tort, both husband and wife are deemed to have a property
interest in the society or consortium of the other. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d
811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25
So. 338 (1899); Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa 609 (1876); Note, Judicial Treatment of
Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLO. L. REV. 1341 (1961). A third party un-
reasonably invades that right by either physically injuring one spouse, Montgomery v.
Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Wilde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d
129
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clubs,38 viz., that they deserve the coercive protection of the law be-
cause society presumes them inherently worthwhile based on widely
shared fundamental values.39 This element in the modem law has
a two-fold origin: first, by way of the courts of chancery as bearers of
the King's conscience; 40 secondly, by a reinfusion into the law of the
feudal element of relation under which duties and obligations were
determined on the basis of the relation between the parties in lieu
of, or even in spite of, contractual arrangements. 4 1 These values can
be considered instrumental in the sense that they are deemed impor-
tant toward promoting a better society, but largely they are considered
important in and of themselves as part of the prevailing social ethic.
42
Thus, in family law, parents have certain duties and obligations to
their children reflecting the feudal concept of relation; 43 the nuclear
family is deemed worthy of protection, and the courts do not consider
530 (1947), directly alienating the affections of one spouse, Rank v. Kuhn, 236 Iowa
854, 20 N.W.2d 72 (1945); Dey v. Dey, 94 N.J.L. 342, 110 A. 703 (1920), or having
sexual intercourse with one spouse, Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79
(1947); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959).
It should be emphasized that the object of protection is the marital relation itself,
not any particular aspect of it such as services or society, although these may be
elements of the damage. Dey v. Dey, 94 N.J.L. at 344-45, 110 A. at 704. That the
stability of the family unit itself is the object of protection may be inferred from
the fact that contributory behavior on the part of either spouse is no bar to re-
covery. See, e.g., Sikes v. Tippins, 85 Ga. 231, 11 S.E. 662 (1892) (condoning wife's
adultery no bar to husband's recovery); Hardy v. Bach, 173 Ill. App. 123 (1912)
(wife's reputation for unchastity before and after marriage is no bar to action);
Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86 S.W.2d 293 (1935) (proof that plaintiff's spouse was
the seducer is no bar to recovery).
Similarly, both parents have a property interest in the physical society of their
minor children. Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1956); Becker v. Reick, 19
Misc. 2d 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (plaintiff's loss, though predicated on
negligence, is in the nature of an infringement on a property right). The child in
some states has a property interest in the society of his parents. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.
v. Gaudet, 94 S. Ct. 806 (1974); Heck v. Schupp, 394 II1. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
In addition, the wife and children have a property interest in the husband's obli-
gation of support. Schumm v. Berg, 37 Cal. 2d 174, 231 P.2d 39 (1951); Commonwealth
v. Homer, 168 Pa. Super. 411, 77 A.2d 641 (1951). To a limited extent, the wife
also has a statutory obligation for the expenses of the family. Cupit v. Brooks, 223
Miss. 887, 79 So. 2d 58 (1955); Hall v. Jordan, 190 Tenn. 1, 227 S.W.2d 35 (1950); A.
JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 702-03 (1961).
38. See note 66 infra.
39. See R. POUND, supra note 21, at 71, 141.
40. Id. at 72-73.
41. See id. at 1-31; Reich, supra note 14, at 768.
42. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 243-51 (1973). The "prevailing social
ethic" can be considered the modern analogue of the King's conscience.
43. See R. POUND, supra note 21, at 84-85, 195-96. This is what Professor Pound has
called the feudal element in the law. It was based on analogy to the relation between
lord and tenant, each of whom owed duties to the other based upon the relation.
This was the background for the
juristic conception of rights, duties, and liabilities arising, not from express un-
dertaking, the terms of any transaction, voluntary wrongdoing or culpable action,
but simply and solely as the incidents of the relation.
Id. at 20. See Wigmore, The Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 HARV. L. REv. 200 (1894)
(a relation is described as a nexus, which has a double aspect, i.e., a right on one
hand, and a duty on the other).
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evidence meant either to prove or to cast doubt upon its value to
society. As new perceptions of the social ethic grow, new interests
and rights are given protection. 44
The prevailing social ethic has long recognized the intrinsic value
of education and its worth to the individual quite apart from the
economic value of producing an educated citizenry. 45 The importance
attached to providing greater educational opportunity is evident in
the constant stream of aid-to-education laws of both federal and state
governments. 46 In addition, the social status which education carries
provides a significant indication of the high value placed on the
student-university relationship. 47 Education also has a substantial im-
pact, arguably beyond its actual skill-increasing effect, on income and
occupational status.48 In our increasingly technological society this
impact is generally perceived as being more significant today than
it was a half century ago. Education is, furthermore, considered the
major institution other than the family which prepares young people
for their adult life. 49 It is, in short, a relationship of crucial impor-
tance to the prevailing social ethic for reasons closely analogous to
44. Pound, Survey, supra note 17, at 21-24. Wellington, supra note 42, at 246-54,
265-67, 289-95, 302-11, suggests three sources for courts to consult in order to recognize
developments in the prevailing social ethic, all of which rely on the legal-rational
process of analogy: statutes dealing with analogous areas of the law; analogy to ex-
isting rights of action given by the common law; analogy with other protected interests.
45. It might be objected that the majority in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), felt that education is not a fundamental interest pro-
tected by the Constitution. This, however, does not speak to the thrust of the argument
here. There is a great deal of difference between fundamental interests for constitu-
tional purposes and other valuable interests which, while not rising to the level of a
constitutional right, nevertheless receive the protection of the common law. Most of
the valuable interests enumerated in notes 26 and 37 supra fall into the latter category.
46. See SUBCOINm. ON EDUC. OF THE SENATE COIM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
FEDERAL AND STATE STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, S. Doc. No. 73, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
HOUSE COMIM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, A GUIDE TO STUDENT ASSISTANCE, H.R. Doe. No.
221, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). See generally M. USDAN, D. MINAR & E. HURwITz, EDU-
CATION AND STATE POLITICS 11-163 (1968).
47. See C. JENCKS, supra note 34, at 180-86, 191, 220-24; T. PARSONS & G. PLATr, THE
AMIERICAN UNIVERSITY 327-39 (1973); cf. p. 129 supra. See also A. GRISWOLD, LIBERAL
EDUCATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 3-4 (1959); C. JENCKS & D. RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC
REVOLUTION 85-90 (1968); A. REISS, OCCUPATIONS AND SOCIAL STATUS (1961).
48. See C. JENCKS, supra note 34, at 191, 220-21; cf. T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING
IN AMERICA 135-47 (1918).
49. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973), quoting
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213, 221 (1972); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1129 (1969). Two prominent sociol-
ogists have made an in-depth comparison of the socialization process in the family and
in undergraduate college and have concluded that the two institutions have a similar
role in the development of young people. T. PARSONS & G. PLATr, supra note 47, at
18-22, 163-224. See generally E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950); D. SCHNEIDER,
ANERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968). As Justice Marshall noted in his dis-
sent in Rodriguez, the fact that 48 of 50 states constitutionally require free public
education and enforce those provisions with compulsory attendance laws strongly suggests
the fundamental role of education in American society. 411 U.S. at 111-12 (Marshall &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
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those underlying the legal protection afforded to the family unit.50
In summary, valuable interests are protected if they are perceived
as being sufficiently important to economic potential, or if they are
deemed inherently worthwhile by the prevailing social ethic. The
student-university relationship meets both tests.
II. Protection of Members of Private Associations
That the student's interest is substantial has been demonstrated.
Maintaining his status as student allows him to grow by making use
of the opportunities for enrichment provided by the school's facilities
and by the very existence of the university community-an intrinsic
value widely recognized under the prevailing social ethic. The degree
which represents the completion of his studies is, moreover, a neces-
sity if he is to engage in certain valuable economic activities. The
courts should, therefore, grant the student protection, but, in doing
so, they need not act in a vacuum. They can work within the frame-
work of the legal protection already given to other similar relation-
ships, most notably that afforded to members of private associations
in expulsion proceedings.
A. The Common Law of Private Associations
At English common law, a member of a private association was
protected against expulsions which were contrary to "natural justice."5'
Perhaps the leading case stating the nature of this protection is
Dawkins v. Antrobus5 2 in which the litigious Colonel Dawkins sued
50. A student's residence at a university closely resembles family life in the sense
that the student matures and is guided in his formative years by the strength of the
university experience. Universities proclaim themselves to be places where young people
not only may obtain instruction in fields of academic knowledge, but as places to
develop maturity and insight.
51. See S. CHAKRAVERTIS, NATURAL JUSTICE OR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1967); S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REvIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 101-65
(Ist ed. 1959); natural justice has been described as "what would be regarded as fair
and just and seemly and sensible by the ordinary, reasonable, well-disposed, well-
informed and impartial citizen." Morris, The Court and Domestic Tribunals, 69 LAw
Q.R. 318, 323 (1953). See Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023,
1025-37 (1974).
The British refer to bodies vested with the power to inflict a highly penal sanction
as "quasi-judicial." See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Adamson, 29 T.L.R. 367, 368 (Ch. 1913) (power
of expulsion from the club highly penal); Glynn v. Keele Univ., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 487
(Ch.) (power of suspension of student from premises highly penal, therefore action
was quasi-judicial). The proceedings of any such quasi-judicial body, or domestic
tribunal, must conform to the principle of natural justice. Morris, supra, at 321. See
Pett v. Greyhound Racing Ass'n (1), [1969] 1 Q.B. 125 (C.A.); General Med. Council
v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627; Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615 (C.A. 1881); ef.
Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, 118 (C.A.); Davis v. Carew-Pole,
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 833 (Q.B.); Cookson v. Harewood, [1932] 2 K.B. 478.
52. 17 Ch. D. 615 (C.A. 1881), discussed at length in Chafee, supra note 9, at 993-95,
1014-20. See also Fisher v. Keane, 11 Ch. D. 353 (C.A. 1878); Innes v. Wylie, [1844] 1
Car. & K. 257 (Q.B.).
Vol. 84: 120, 1974
Common Law Rights for Private University Students
for readmission to the Travellers' Club after he had been expelled
for conduct allegedly injurious to the character of the club (for cir-
culating a pamphlet lampooning Lieutenant General Stephenson,
himself a club member). The colonel lost his lawsuit but won for
future generations of unpopular club members court, protection for
their procedural rights. The court of appeals in Dawkins stated that
expulsions from private associations will be overturned if motivated
by actual malice, if the substantive basis for the expulsion and the
proceedings thereto were ultra vires or if the procedures used were
contrary to natural justice.53 The requirements of natural justice,
deemed to have been met in Dawkins, were that the accused have
both notice of the charges against him and the opportunity to be
heard in his own defense. 54 In addition, subsequent cases concerning
expulsions from private associations established the right of members
to meet and controvert the evidence presented in favor of expulsion, 55
but did not establish any absolute rights to cross-examination,56 coun-
sel,57 or the trappings of a criminal trial.58
Due process is the American analogue of natural justice, and the
53. Brett, L.J., stated:
The only real question which a court can properly consider is whether the mem-
bers of the club, under such circumstances, have acted ultra vires or not, and it
seems to me the only questions a court can properly entertain for that purpose
are, whether anything has been done which is contrary to natural justice, although
it is within the rules of the club-in other words, whether the rules of the club
are contrary to natural justice .
Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615, 630 (C.A. 1881).
54. Id. at 631. See Fisher v. Keane, 11 Ch. D. 353 (C.A. 1878) (notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard not given; trial committee not properly convened); Labouchere v.
Earl of Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. D. 346 (1879) (no due inquiry, no notice of definite
charge, improper notice to summon meeting, resolution to expel carried by insufficient
majority); D'Arcy v. Adamson, 29 T.L.R. 367, 368 (Ch. 1913) (no notice); Burn v.
National Amalg'd Labourers' Union, [1920] 2 Ch. 364 (union proceeding contrary to
natural justice); cf. Leeson v. General Council of Med. Educ., 43 Ch. D. 366 (C.A. 1889);
General Med. Council v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627. See generally R. POUND, CASES ON
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFAMATION AND INJURIES TO PERSONALITY 95-98 (2d ed. 1930).
55. Pett v. Greyhound Racing Ass'n (II), [1970] 1 Q.B. 46; Ceylon Univ. v. Fernando,
[1960] 1 NV.L.R. 223 (P.C.); Board of Educ. v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179; General Med.
Council v. Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627; Rex v. St. Mary's Abbotts Kensington Assess.
Comm., [1891] 1 Q.B. 378; De Verteuil v. Knaggs, [1918] A.C. 557; Byrne v. Kinema-
tograph Renters Soc'y, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 762 (Ch.). This right to controvert contrary
evidence was described as the right to "correct or controvert any relevant statement
brought forward to his prejudice." Knaggs, supra, at 560-61. See also Leeson v. General
Council of Med. Educ., 43 Ch. D. 366, 379 (C.A. 1889).
56. Ceylon Univ. v. Fernando, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223 (P.C.). The court apparently
would have allowed Fernando a right of cross-examination if he had made a timely
request at the time of his hearing. See de Smith, University Discipline and Natural
Justice, 23 MoD. L. REV. 428 (1960).
57. Pett v. Greyhound Racing Ass'n (II), [1970] 1 Q.B. 46. In Pett v. Greyhound
Racing Ass'n (I), [1969] 1 Q.B. 125, 133 (C.A.), the court in dicta said that when an
individual's "reputation or livelihood" was affected by an action of a private asso-
ciation, the individual had a right to counsel.
58. See, e.g., Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120 (requirements of natural
justice depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules
under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so
forth).
133
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state courts have intervened to guarantee members of private associ-
ations, incorporated and unincorporated, procedural rights against ex-
pulsion if the group's procedural rules were contrary to due process, 501
59. See, e.g., Local No. 57, Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944) (expulsion conclusive on civil court if association
gave notice and hearing, conducted in accordance with its rules, and acted in good
faith); Cason v. Glass Blower's Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 143, 231 P.2d 6, 10-11 (1951)
(expulsion proceedings of private associations must not be malicious, contrary to the
rules of the association, or contrary to natural justice; fair trial guaranteed); Smith v.
Kern County Med. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 265, 120 P.2d 874, 875 (1942) (function of
court in ,expulsion from private associations is to determine whether association acted
within its powers in good faith, in accordance with its laws and the laws of the land);
Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Med. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 253, 293 P.2d
862, 869 (1956) (expulsion from a private association unreviewable as long as it is
accomplished according to the rules of the association, in good faith, and according
to the law of the land); Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677, 679,
254 P.2d 587, 588-89 (1953) (due process guarantees of notice, hearing and a fair
trial in expulsions imposed even if not in the rules of the association,; Davis v.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 715, 141
P.2d 486, 488 (1943) (function of court in expulsion from private associations is to
determine if association acted within its powers in good faith, in accordance with its
laws and the laws of the land); Ellis v. AFL, 48 Cal. App. 2d 440, 443-44, 120 P.2d
79, 80-81 (1941) (no suspension of a member or a subordinate body from an association
without charges, notice and hearing, even if the association's rules make no provision
for it); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 111. App. 2d 352, 369, 192 N.E.2d
414, 423 (1963) (interest in being a member of a professional association protected
against deprivation by association if it acts with malice, outside its powers and rules,
or contrary to due process or natural justice); Brooks v. Petroleum Club, 207 Kan. 277,
484 P.2d 1026 (1971) (expulsion valid if inflicted with substantial compliance of bylaws
and bylaws do not violate due process); Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 308, 142 A.2d
798, 802 (1958) (equity will enter internal affairs of private associations where an ex-
pulsion is arbitrary or not in accordance with the rules of the organization); Universal
Lodge v. Valentine, 134 Md. 505, 517, 107 A. 531, 535 (1919) (quoting the lower court's
opinion, plaintiff did not have fair trial as constitution of the association, its rules
and regulations, or as justice and fair dealing require); Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n
v. First Dist. Ass'n, 284 Minn. 335, 339, 170 N.W.2d 425, 427 (1969) (expulsion must
be based on violation of rule of association which does not violate law of land or
any public policy); Peters v. Minnesota Dep't of Ladies G.A.R., 239 Minn. 133, 136,
58 N.W.2d 58, 60 (1953) (notice and hearing, the minimum standards of fairness, are
required); Junkins v. Local No. 6313, Communications Workers, 241 Mo. App. 1029,
271 S.W.2d 71 (1954) (expulsion proceedings of association must be conducted within
its rules, in good faith, with fair notice to the accused and must afford him an op-
portunity to be heard in his defense); Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 11-12, 162
N.Y.S.2d 576, 586-87 (1957) (although standards of due process less stringent than courts,
substantial rights must be preserved,; Hawkins v. Obremski, 33 Misc. 2d 1009, 1011,
227 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (expulsion from an association requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard); Pegg v. United Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 2d 600,
601, 167 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (court review of expulsion proceedings of
private associations limited to ensuring that procedure was in accordance with asso-
ciation's bylaws, that the charges were substantial, and that the member had fair
notice and the opportunity to be heard); Van Valkenburgh v. Chemists' Club, 38 N.Y.S.2d
228, 229 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (where there was no procedure in bylaws pertaining to sus-
pension, courts impose standards requiring notice and a fair trial); Harmon v. Matthews,
27 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (member of trade union or any voluntary asso-
ciation is entitled to have charges made known to him, be confronted by accusers
and witnesses against him, to reasonable opportunity to question or cross-examine
them, to examine the evidence, .and to answer, explain, defend, and present evidence
in his own behalf); Yockel v. German American Bund, 20 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-78 (Sup.
Ct. 1940) (summary expulsion is not justified as it is contrary to the law of the land
and the Constitution; accused must have a fair trial and an opportunity to defend
himself); Local 38-123, Longshoremen v. Green, 157 Ore. 394, 402, 72 P.2d 55, 58
(1937) (in expulsions an association must follow its own rules, but this is not sufficient
if it fails to give sufficient protection against arbitrary action); Bullard v. Austin
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or if the action taken were ultra vires6 ° or in bad faith 1-the same
tests set forth in Dawkins. In an early case, Loubat v. Le Roy, a New
York court applied common law procedural requirements to an un-
incorporated association:
The legal principle is a general one affecting all proceedings
which may result in loss of property, position or character, or any
disaster to another; that he shall be first heard by the board or
tribunal considering his case before that body will be legally
permitted to pronounce his condemnation. 2
The American courts have followed their British brethren and denied
review of the expulsion on the merits, but where serious economic
injury was at stake, they have scrutinized the expulsion to determine
whether it was based on substantial evidence or evidence sufficient
to show the decision was in good faith. 3 These principles have been
Real Estate Bd., Inc., 376 S.W.2d 870, 874-75 (rex. Civ. App. 1964) (judicial inter-
vention into affairs of private association if expulsion procedure is contrary to natural
justice); cases collected in R. POUND, supra note 54, at 95; Chafee, supra note 9, at
1014-20.
60. See, e.g., Local No. 57, Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944); Cason v. Glass Blower's Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 143,
231 P.2d 6, 10-11 (1951); Smith v. Kern County Med. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 265, 120
P.2d 874, 875 (1942); Taboada v. Sociedad Espanola, 191 Cal. 187, 215 P. 673 (1923);
Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Med. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 253, 293 P.2d
862, 869 (1956); Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 713, 715, 141 P.2d 486, 488 (1943); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402 (1917);
Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 II1. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963);
Brooks v. Petroleum Club, 207 Kan. 277, 484 P.2d 1026 (1971); Wilson v. Pine Knot
Council, 175 Ky. 502, 194 S.W. 537 (1917); Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 308, 142
A.2d 798, 802 (1958); Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675 (1970); Walsh v.
Local 59, Theatrical Stage Employees, 22 N.J. Misc. 161, 162, 37 A.2d 667, 668 (Ch.),
aff'd, 136 N.J. Eq. 115, 40 A.2d 623 (1944); Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593,
177 A. 102 (Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 119 N.J. Eq. 377, 182 A. 874 (1936); Pegg v. United
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 2d 600, 167 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Local 38-123,
Longshoremen v. Green, 157 Ore. 394, 72 P.2d 55 (1937); Berberian v. Lancaster Os-
teopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959); Allen v. Office Employees
Int'l Union, 53 Wash. 2d 1, 329 P.2d 205 (1958); cases collected in R. POUND, supra
note 54, at 96; J. GRODIN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND THE LAW-BRITISH AND AMERICAN
EXPERIENCES 97-98 (1961).
61. See, e.g., Junkins v. Local No. 6313, Communications Workers, 241 Mo. App. 1029,
271 S.W.2d 71 (1954) (expulsion proceedings not conducted fairly or honestly, bias was
shown). While courts rarely find an expulsion to be in bad faith, almost all of them
recite good faith, or lack of maliciousness, as one of the standards of expulsion pro-
ceedings. See cases cited in note 59 supra.
62. 40 Hun. (47 N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 546, 551-52, 17 Abb. N. Cas. 512 (1886).
63. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 164-65,
460 P.2d 495, 498, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (19691; McCune v. Wilson, 237 So. 2d 169,
172-73 (Fla. 1970); Van Daele v. Vinci, 51 Ill. 2d 389, 394-95, 282 N.E.2d 728, 731-32
(1972); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963);
Kurk v. Medical Soc'y, 46 Misc. 2d 79, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct.), revd on other
grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 928, 223 N.E.2d
499, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1966); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa.
257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959). See generally Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1036 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Developments-Private Associations].
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applied to the expulsion proceedings of such diverse groups as mutual
aid insurance associations,6 4 unions,65 social clubs,0 6 and to both ex-
pulsions67 and refusals of admittance68 by medical associations.
64. Taboada v. Sociedad Espanola, 191 Cal. 187, 215 P. 673 (1923); Curl v. Pacific
Home, 108 Cal. App. 2d 655, 239 P.2d 481 (1952); Gervasi v. Societa Giusippi Garibaldi,
96 Conn. 50, 112 A. 693 (1921); D'Aloia v. Unione Fratellanza Italiana, 84 N.J.L.
683, 87 A. 472 (E. & A. 1913); Schwankert v. New Jersey State P.B.A., 77 N.J. Super.
224, 185 A.2d 877 (1962); Wachtel v. Noah Widows & Orphans Benev. Soc'y, 84 N.Y.
28, 38 Am. Rep. 478 (1881); Kokolas v. Johnson City Lodge No. 311, 66 Misc. 2d 39,
319 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Pepe v. Missanellese Soc'y of Mut. Aid, 141 Misc. 7,
252 N.Y.S. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Macavicza v. Workingman's Club, 246 Pa. 136, 92 A. 41
(1914); Ondo v. Greek-Catholic Union of Russian Bhds., 155 Pa. Super. 492, 38 A.2d
370 (1944); cf. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969).
65. Local No. 57, Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16
So. 2d 705 (1944); Cason v. Glass Bottle Blower's Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6
(1951); Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' Protective 9- Benev. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217
(1888); Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 60 Cal. App.
2d 713, 141 P.2d 486 (1943); junkins v. Local No. 6313, Communications Workers, 241
Mo. App. 1029, 271 S.W.2d 71 (1954); Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d
825 (1942); Brooks v. Engar, 259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, appeal dismissed,
284 N.Y. 767, 31 N.E.2d 514 (1940); Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y.S.
336 (1931); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958); Schwankert
v. New Jersey State P.B.A., 77 N.J. Super. 224, 185 A.2d 877 (1962); Harmon v. Matthews,
27 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See generally Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers
v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128
N.E. 704 (1920); Howland v. Local 306, UAW, 323 Mich. 305, 35 N.W.2d 166 (1948);
Cotton Jamers & Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S.W. 553
(1900); McGinley v. Milk & Ice Cream Salesmen, 351 Pa. 47, 40 A.2d 16 (1944); Summers,
The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 200-06
(1960); cf. Walsh v. Local 59, Theatrical Stage Employees, 22 N.J. Misc. 161, 37 A.2d
667 (Ch. 1944); Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. Div. 2d 521, 184 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1959). But see
Simpson v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 38 W. Va. 355, 98 S.E. 580,
cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919); State ex rel. Dame v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28
N.W.2d 349 (1947). Union members are now guaranteed procedural rights by the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970).
66. See Brooks v. Petroleum Club, 207 Kan. 277, 484 P.2d 1026 (1971); Universal
Lodge v. Valentine, 134 Md. 505. 107 A. 531 (1919); Peters v. Minnesota Dep't of Ladies
GAR, 239 Minn. 133, 58 N.W.2d 58 (1953); Stahl v. Romanian Young Men's Ass'n, 77
N.J.L. 380, 71 A. 1114 (Sup. Ct. 1909); State ex rel. Sibley v. Board of Management of
the Carteret Club of Elizabeth, 40 N.J.L. 295 (Sup. Ct. 1878); Spiegelman v. Engineers
Country Club, 38 App. Div. 2d 728, 329 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1972); Cheney v. Ketcham, 7
Ohio Dec. 183 (C.P. 1898); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Beneficial Inst., 2 S. & R.
141 (Pa. 1815); cf. Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y. 353, 55 N.E. 919 (1900). But see Manning
v. San Antonio Club, 63 Tex. 166 (1884).
There is no protection for members of church societies involved in doctrinal disputes,
probably because of the unwillingness of courts to intervene in areas concerning re-
ligious belief. See, e.g., Moustakis v. Helenic Orthodox Soc'y, 261 Mass. 462, 159 N.E.
453 (1928). See generally Comment, The Power of Courts over the Internal Affairs of
Religious Groups, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 322 (1955); Comment, Judicial Intervention in
Disputes Within Independent Church Bodies, 54 MIcH. L. REV. 102 (1955).
Courts are much less hesitant, however, to intervene in church affairs when no issues
of doctrine are involved. See Swafford v. Keaton, 23 Ga. App. 238, 98 S.E. 122 (1919);
Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675 (1970); Hendryx v. Peoples' United Church,
42 Wash. 336, 84 P. 1123 (1906).
67. Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Med. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d
862 (1956); State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Med. Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 4U8
(1869); Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665
(1968); Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958); cf. Baugh v.
Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 265 A.2d 675 (1970).
68. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 147 A.2d 817 (1963);
Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); Note,
Judicially Compelled Admission to Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 1186 (1961).
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Unfortunately, neither British nor American courts were quite able
to articulate just what interest they were protecting when they required
natural justice or due process in the expulsion proceedings of private
associations. The Dawkins court felt that there was an underlying
property interest in the assets of the club which required its scrutiny
and justified its intervention.69 In an earlier case Lord Denman had
held a member's expulsion without notice unlawful simply for being
contrary to natural justice, but on rehearing hedged by implying that
he was merely supplying a rule left out of a contract, although such
a contract could conceivably include a judicially enforceable rule for
summary expulsion. 0
With this insecure foundation, it is not surprising to find the cases
foundering in a sea of doctrinal doubt. Some courts have considered
the interest of the member in the assets of the association as the basis
for guaranteeing procedural rights in expulsions. Members' rights to
use the physical property of the association, to share in its tangible
assets on dissolution, to have an opportunity to be elected to a sal-
aried office, and to earn a livelihood (where that right is severely
hampered unless the plaintiff is a member of the association) have
been held to be property interests which serve as a basis for the courts'
jurisdiction.71 Legal commentators, however, have pointed out the
often disingenuous quality of a court's search for such a tangible
property interest before protecting the procedural rights of members.72
Perhaps the ultimate tension created by blind adherence to a restricted
property theory of this sort is illustrated by Baird v. Wells, 7 3 where
the court recognized the member's reputation as the real interest at
stake, but found that the lack of a tangible property interest prevented
69. Dawkins v. Antrobus, 17 Ch. D. 615, 620 (C.A. 1881).
70. Innes v. Wylie, [1844] 1 Car. & K. 257 (Q.B.).
71. See Suckle v. Madison Gen'l Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974) (property
right of doctor in membership on hospital staff could have been developed); Davis
v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 97 N.W.2d 137 (1959) (right to use association's physical
property); Barr -.. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894) (right
to engage in lawful business); Heaton v. Hull, 51 App. Div. 126, 64 N.Y.S. 279 (1900)
(right to use association's property); Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y.S. 921 (Sup.
Ct. 1904) (right to use corporate property and to share assets on dissolution); Williams
v. District Executive Bd., UMW, I Pa. D. & C. 31 (Lackawanna C.P. 1921) (possibility
of being elected salaried officer as potential property interest). These cases are discussed
in Developments-Private Associations, supra note 63, at 999.
72. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 9, at 999-1001 (traditional property theory unsatis-
factory because it diverts courts from real interests at stake, and makes decisions turn
on an immaterial factor).
73. 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890). This interpretation may be inferred from the fact that the
court felt it had no jurisdiction in the case, but went to some length to declare the
expulsion wrongful. The plaintiff filed a statement that he was satisfied that his
expulsion had been declared wrongful by the court, and would therefore let the
matter rest. This case is discussed in Chafee, supra note 9, at 1000; Developments-Private
Associations, supra note 63, at 1000; Expulsion of a Member of a Club, 70 SOL. J.
828 (1926).
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equitable relief. It is hard to accept a rationale which results in en-
joining expulsion where a scintilla of tangible property can be dis-
covered to afford a technical basis for relief even though injury to
that interest is not the significant damage at stake, but which denies
relief for an equally severe injury where no such scintilla can be
found.7
4
In casting about for a satisfactory legal niche into which to fit the
law of associations, many courts have chosen the law of contracts, 75
for, on first blush, it appears that the members of an association simply
have a contractual agreement with each other. Hence, all rights and
restrictions would flow from the contract, interpreted under the or-
dinary guidelines for the law of contracts. It would follow that if the
association acted within its rules, and those rules had been made part
of the contract but did not violate any public policy, the courts could
only enforce the terms of the agreement.
In a leading critique, Professor Chafee has demonstrated the legal
anomalies and the internal contradictions of the contract theory.
Chafee argues, first of all, that the contract theory does not explain
why the courts would defer to the association's interpretation of its
own rules; for if the violation of an association rule is a breach of
contract, then the court should be the final arbiter. Secondly, if the
action for wrongful expulsion were in contract, then the several mem-
bers of the association would be individually liable for whatever
damage has occurred; yet American courts have almost uniformly
denied the existence of such an action at law by the expelled member.
Furthermore, in those actions at law which have been allowed, re-
covery has sounded in tort, so that the member can recover for injury
to reputation or punitive damages. In addition, the injunctive or
mandamus remedies normally granted to the successful suitor in an
action for illegal expulsion are supposed to protect only rights of
property and substance, whereas breaches of contract are not generally
enjoined. Finally, the requirement that expulsion not be malicious
or in bad faith, and the imposition of procedural guarantees where
74. Chafee, supra note 9, at 1000.
75. See, e.g., Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 P. 763 (1897); University of Miami
v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 488 (Fla.
1966); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, afj'd mem.,
12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601,
122 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910). The contract theory is elaborated and discussed in
Chafee, supra note 9, at 1001-07; Developments-Private Associations, supra note 63,
at 1001-02. See Summers, supra note 65, at 179 (relief to wrongfully expelled member
at common law based on contract theory).
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there are none in the purported contract, are not doctrines ordinarily
associated with the law of contracts.70
The basic argument against the contract theory with regard to pri-
vate associations is, however, that it confuses consensual relationships,
which include contract as a subset, with strictly contractual relation-
ships.77 In the latter, the law imposes an obligation because of a prom-
ise supported by consideration signifying an agreement,78 and the
obligation is exactly limited to the agreement. With the former, the
law imposes obligations outside of any agreement of the parties be-
cause of the nature of the relationship and its importance to society.
7 9
76. Chafee, supra note 9, at 1001-07. See also Lahiff v. St. Joseph's Soc'y, 76 Conn.
648, 57 A. 692 (1904) (mental suffering included); Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609,
48 N.Y.S. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (union liable for suspended member's loss of wages);
Lytle v. New Castle Ag. Ass'n, 91 Pa. Super. 152 (1927) (trespass against member of
association for causing expulsion of another).
Some of Chafee's technical arguments can be countered. Courts can void provisions
of contracts if the terms seem unduly harsh on party where there is gross inequality
of bargaining position. It might be inferred that courts are doing this when they
impose due process standards on associations. Against courts' deference to an asso-
ciation's interpretation of its own rules as being alien to a theory of contract is the
argument that it is an implied term of the contract that the member will be bound
by the decision of the association's tribunal. See Developments-Private Associations,
supra note 63, at 1001-02.
77. Examples of consensual relations which extend beyond mere contractual rela-
tions are husband-wife-child, see note 37 supra; principal-agent, see RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY (SECOND) §§ 140, 153, 159-202, 212-67, 320-59 (1958); lawyer-client, see AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES (1967);
bank-depositor (to a more limited extent), see Milonich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d
759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367
P.2d 284 (1961); fiduciary-beneficiary, see RESATEMIENT OF TRusTs (SECOND) §§ 169-226a,
261-79 (1959).
78. See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806-13 (1941).
79. To be stre, there is a thin line between "promises" held to be inherent in the
agreement-i.e., implied conditions-and obligations imposed outside of the agreement
because of the policy of the law. Concerning implied conditions, see Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); Bell v. Lever Bros., [1932] A.C.
161, 224-27; Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). Further-
more, much of contract law is concerned with determining the "agreement" of the
parties on a particular issue to which the parties did not direct their attention at
the time of the making of the contract. The law in this gap-filling function, a
function which occupies the mass of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ART. II, must of necessity
make reference to general principles existing beyond the parties' agreement; but in
so doing the law still draws its legitimacy from the parties' own promises and seeks
only to make those promises judicially manageable when the promises are somewhat
inexact. Fuller, supra note 78, at 808. Furthermore, the law will not enforce promises
which are outside social policies independent of the parties' agreement; indeed legal
coercive enforcement is not inherent in the contractual relationship but depends upon
social policy. See 2 R. ELY, supra note 17, at 615-18; Fuller, supra note 78, at 806-13.
Once the law establishes a contractual relationship, however, it generally permits the
parties to determine the rights and duties of that relationship. See generally E. PETERs,
COMMERCIAL TRNSACrONS 230-75 (1971). With consensual relations the law takes a
more active role in determining the legal rights and duties of the parties and does
not generally permit the parties to erect their own set of rights and duties. See note
77 supra; Lanahan v. Nevius, 317 A.2d 521 (D.C. App. 1974) (held that a father's legal
obligation to support his minor children could not be limited by a separation agree-
ment, and that the courts would impose minimum standards regardless of the terms
of that agreement. The separation agreement, on the other hand, regarding the re-
ciprocal obligations of husband and wife to each other, was deemed to be a contract
with which the court felt it could not interfere in the absence of fraud, duress or
concealment).
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It is significant that the courts were willing to impose procedural
rights in the private association cases, not only when the alleged con-
tract between the member and the association was silent on the mem-
ber's rights in expulsion proceedings, but even when this contract
expressly denied such rights.80 It is clear, therefore, that the courts
found an interest of the member, apart from the contract, which they
deemed worthy of protection. But since the courts seldom articulated
the rationale behind their decisions, it was not clear what this interest,
which ihey found merited protection, precisely was.
Chafee has offered the beginnings of a theory. He argues that the
real object of judicial protection is the status a member acquires
based on his relation to the association."' Thus, wrongful expulsion
is, in Chafee's view, a tort; suing in tort is the legal form for protecting
valuable interests of this kind from unreasonable invasion.8 2 This
formulation is undoubtedly correct; indeed, in some cases such an
approach has already been adopted.83 Nevertheless, it explains nothing
about why such a status interest should be protected.
Such an explanation must depend on the underlying rationales for
protecting any interest against unreasonable deprivation. These, as
previously discussed, are rooted in the dual standards of enterprise-
worth and imFortance to the prevailing social ethic. Analysis of these
criteria provides a basis for a systematic evolution of the law to en-
compass associations whose members have similar interests but who
have heretofore received only ambivalent protection. Such an associ-
ation is the private university.
B. The University as a Private Association
Whatever doubts may have existed that the requirements of natural
justice or due process applied to expulsions from universities under
British law8 4 were dispelled by Ceylon University v. Fernando.8 5
There, a student expelled for allegedly cheating on an examination
80. See cases cited in notes 55-68 supra.
81. Chafee, supra note 9, at 1007. This view has little explicit support in the case
law, although the recent New Jersey cases granting relief at common law to those
expelled or excluded from private association expressly hold that status rights are the
subject of judicial protection. See cases cited in notes 67-68 supra. Professor Ely be-
lieved all property rights basically involve questions of relation or status. See 1 R.
ELY, supra note 17, at 96-108.
82. See notes 26 & 37 supra.
83. See, e.g., Loubat v. LeRoy, 40 Hun. (47 N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 546, 17 Abb. N. Cas. 512
(1886); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77 (1887).
84. See Rex v. Dunsheath ex rel. Meredith, [1951] 1 K.B. 127; Ex parte Death,
[1852] 18 Q.B. 647.
85. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 223, 1 All E.R. 631 (P.C.). See de Smith, supra note 55.
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was held to have a right under the principles of natural justice to a
hearing and to an opportunity to controvert the evidence against him.
Indeed, the requirements of natural justice have in earlier times
been applied to expulsions from universities by American courts as
well, guaranteeing notice and an opportunity to defend and contro-
vert evidence adduced by the university in favor of expulsion. A
leading case is Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauleys0 in which
the court expressly relied on private association precedent in over-
turning an expulsion. 7 Despite this promising beginning, however,
the protection for procedural rights of students at common law was
not founded on a well-articulated doctrinal basis. As a result the
standards of Hill were easy prey for the notion that procedural rights
for students were subversive of university discipline. 8 The erosion
of Hill's precepts was stimulated by two interrelated legal develop-
ments: the rise of the in loco parentis doctrine and the tendency to
conceive of the student-university relationship as being purely con-
tractual in nature.
In the eyes of many students, the in loco parentis doctrine is
nothing more than the justification offered by college administrators
when other justifications fail. The invidiousness of this doctrine was
86. 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77, 84-85 (1887). The court specifically relied on association and
natural justice precedent in declaring a very expansive view of students' rights, rejected
the in loco parentis argument, id. at 87-88, and recognized the status of the student
as the protectable interest:
There are tens of thousands of youth continually in attendance at colleges . . .
any of whom may suffer degradation and irreparable injury to reputation as
well as pecuniary loss, by the unjust action of the faculty.
Id. at 86. In another early case, Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904),
counsel for the plaintiff argued that a student "resembles most nearly, perhaps, a
member of a beneficial association." Id. at 627, 57 A. at 16. In its opinion the court
seemed to accept this analogy by referring to the student as a member, id. at 634, 57 A.
at 16, and then using an association analogy, id. at 636, 57 A. at 17. See also Gleason
v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908). More recently in Ryan v.
Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1971), a lower New York court
applied basic procedural standards to a private college as one alternative ground for
overturning the expulsion of a student.
87. See Morrison v. City of Lawrence, 181 Mass. 127, 63 N.E. 400 (1902); Tanton
v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81
Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928); Koblitz v. Western Re-
serve Univ., 21 Ohio Co. Ct. 144, 11 Ohio Co. Dec. 515 (1901); State ex rel. Sherman
v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943). The
vigor of the Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley reasoning is not present in these
cases. In all of them, the court found that a sufficient hearing had been given, while
paying lip service to student procedural rights. The court in Hyman was able to say:
"All the authorities agree that students may not be dismissed or suspended or deprived
of any right without notice and a fair hearing." The court stated that a fair hearing
involved notice, the names of adverse witnesses and an opportunity to make defense.
180 Tenn. at 111, 171 S.W.2d at 827. Yet the court upheld a dismissal based on a
"hearing" which, from the report of the case, fell short of the court's own standard.
88. Rhetoric directed toward this point was employed in Stetson Univ. v. Hunt,
88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 A. 882 (1924);
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, appeal dismissed, 278 U.S.
661 (1928); Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
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illustrated in Stetson University v. Hunt,8 9 where the court upheld
the summary dismissal of a student on the basis of several vague
rumors of misconduct and a general feeling that the student was not
a particularly decorous young woman. The court used very broad
language in asserting that the university, having the right of parents
to discipline their children as they see fit, had no duty whatsoever
to prefer or to prove charges.
The in loco parentis doctrine has now lost much of its force. 0° The
federal courts have rejected it,91 commentators have rejected it,92 and
the students themselves have consistently rejected it. Indeed, it had
little rationality to begin with. Many college students were of majority
age,9 3 but were subjected to "parental" discipline from universities
when their actual parents could not exercise it themselves. Even if
the student were a minor, universities employed disciplinary tactics
which were legally unavailable to the parents; parents have no right
to boot their children out of the house, but colleges were given the
right to expel under the guise of parental authority.
9 4
89. 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924). The court relied on two other cases reasoning
from the in loco parentis premise: Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913);
Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.V. 736 (1907).
90. As the in loco parentis doctrine lost favor, some courts still upheld a school's
exercise of parental discipline, refusing to require due process, on the grounds that
an expulsion decision was merely "disciplinary" and not "adjudicative." This view
was expressed most strongly in People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 111. App.
2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956), and Vermillion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107,
110 N.W. 736 (1907). See generally State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263
P. 433, appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928).
In support of this theory, the courts pointed out that college administrators do not
have the power to subpoena witnesses or punish for perjury, thus adverting to the
administrative law distinction between adjudicative and administrative proceedings.
On the latter distinction, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON AD-
MINisTRATIVE LAW 486-538 (5th ed. 1970). This argument is irrelevant. Whether the
expulsion process is adjudicative depends on the nature of the student's right. If the
student's interest is worthy of protection, then the process of depriving him of that
right is adjudicative, regardless of the power to subpoena witnesses or punish for
perjury. See generally Comment, Colleges and Universities: The Demise of In Loco
Parentis, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 715 (1971).
91. See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala.
1968); Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana
St. Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La. 1968); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
92. See, e.g., Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary
Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966); Note, supra note 7, at 804; Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1143-44 (1967).
93. Parental control rights end upon a person's "emancipation," Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282
N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972), which is presumptively at the age of 21. Limpert v.
Limpert. 119 N.J. Super. 438, 292 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1972); Commonwealth ex rel.
Welsh v. Welsh, 222 Pa. Super. 585, 296 A.2d 891 (1972). See generally Schumm v.
Schumm, 122 N.J. Super. 146, 299 A.2d 423 (Ch. 1973) (presumption of emancipation at
21 not changed by statute lowering age of majority to 18).
94. See Osborn v. Allen, 26 N.J.L. 388, 391-92 (1857) ("The authority and rights of
parents over'their children result from their duties. The law of nature acknowledges
no other foundation of a parent's right. . . . The great natural duties of parents to
their children, maintenance, protection and education, are all recognized at common
law"); sources cited in note 37 supra. See also Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d
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More importantly, American courts have been strongly wedded to
the general idea that the student's relationship to the university is
wholly governed by and fully described in the contract he signs on
matriculation, the university's rules and regulations generally being
part of that contract. According to this view, the student contracts
away his right to due process when he enrolls in a university whose
regulations, which he might never have read, state that the dean of
students has the power to expel a student summarily for a list *of
possible offenses. In Anthony v. Syracuse University"a the court found
that a statement in the college's registration form, which was separate
from the rules, that students could be suspended whenever the ad-
ministration so decided, created a contract terminable at the will of
the college. A similar rationale was employed in Barker v. Bryn Mawr
College,"0 again to uphold a summary dismissal. This rationale did
not mean, however, that students automatically lost all rights upon
matriculation at a private college, since, absent an express term in
the contract to the contrary, the courts were willing to impose mini-
mal standards of good faith upon administrators as implied terms of
the agreement.9 7
769 (1960) (father must provide for minor child's college education; collects conflicting
authorities on that issue).
An in loco parentis relation arises and is continued only by the substitute parent's
willingness to assume all the duties of natural parents, see, e.g., James v. McLinden,
341 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Conn. 1969); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. App. 1968);
Commonwealth ex rel. Morgan v. Smith, 429 Pa. 561, 241 A.2d 531 (1968), including
the duty of support, In re St. John, 272 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Fam. Ct. 1966); Little v. Little,
9 N.C. App. 361, 176 S.E.2d 521 (1970). Thus, a college's unwillingness to continue
support whenever the student has broken college rules indicates the lack of an in-
tention to stand in an in loco parentis relationship with the student; cf. Van Alstyne,
Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 368, 376
(1963). Under the in loco parentis doctrine, there would be no difference in the prerog-
atives of public and private universities toward the student. The in loco parentis
doctrine would also grant universities a right without a duty based on the relation
of university to the student. Of course, the in loco parentis doctrine outside the
university, like the relation between natural parents and their children, involves both
rights and duties.
95. 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
96. 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923), aff'g I Dist. & Co. Rep. 383 (Co. Ct. 1922). The
court in Barker did not feel compelled to find an express term in the contract making
the contract terminable at will, but contented itself with a finding that nothing in
the contract between the private university and Barker required that university to give
procedural rights to students it wished to expel. The reasoning of Barker controlled
the result in Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957). There are
intimations in People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d
635 (1956), that the Barker reasoning may have been a factor underlying that decision
as well. (Illinois has always had a restrictive rule in regard to students' procedural
rights. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Educ., 182 Ill. App. 342 (1913).) But see Moore v.
Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (in a case concerning pro-
cedural rights guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment, the court stated that
the student-university relationship is not purely contractual).
97. In Booker v. Grand Rapids Med. College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 NAV. 589 (1909),
and State ex rel. Burg v. Milwaukee Med. College. 128 Wis. 7, 106 N.W. 116 (1906),
the court would have allowed damages for breach of contract as a remedy for illegal
expulsions. Furthermore, courts which have accepted the contract theory imply a duty
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The contract doctrine is, as has been shown, conclusory9 8 The
issue the courts should confront is whether the status of "student"
is a protectable interest, and whether the student-university relation-
ship engenders obligations for the parties irrespective of their con-
tractual agreement. Mechanical application of the term "contract"
forecloses necessary inquiry into the nature of the interests involved.
The proposition that the student's status should be protected has
already been demonstrated by examination of the fundamental nature
of the student's valuable interest. This interest has both enterprise-
worth and the imprimatur of the prevailing social ethic, the two
major rationales behind protecting any valuable interest as property.
The law governing expulsions from private associations should there-
fore be extended, on this firmer doctrinal footing, to encompass the
student-university relationship, thus affording the student the pro-
tection of common law due process which members of private associ-
ations already enjoy.
There remains to consider one rather technical objection to extend-
ing private association doctrine to students-that students are not
"members" in that they have no role in the governance of their "as-
sociation." 99 The objection is not fatal. First, it is not clear whether
it is factually true in the contemporary university setting; many pri-
vate universities involve students in the governing process directly
and, although they may not elect the president or trustees, students
are delegated significant authority in some areas.100 Furthermore,
this objection, to the extent it focuses on de jure governance, ignores
the more important issue of whether student sentiments are reflected
in decisions of the academic community of which the formal structure
on the part of the administrators not to act arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.
See Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968);
Coffelt v. Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309 (1954); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88
Fla. 510. 102 So. 637 (1924); Nelson v. Lincoln Med. College, 81 Neb. 533, 118 N.W.
122 (1908); Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902); Frank
v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932); cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17
App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd mere., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
One court has even gone so far as to hold that there is an implied term in the
university-student contract that the university give a student every reasonable op-
portunity to defend himself in expulsion cases. Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21
Ohio Co. Ct. 144, 11 Ohio Co. Dec. 515 (1901).
98. See pp. 138-40 supra.
99. In Booker v. Grand Rapids Med. College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909),
and Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 383 (Co. Ct. 1922), af 'd,
278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923), the courts stated in a conclusory fashion that the
students involved were not "members" of the defendant "corporations" (i.e., the col-
leges). Just as "contract" theory is conclusory, i.e., avoids the issue of whether the
complainant has a protectable interest, so really is the label "member" equivalent to
the legal conclusion that the complainant has a protectable interest. The real inquiry,
then, is not who is a member, but whether the interest of the party deserves protection.
100. See T. PARSONS & G. PLAiT, supra note 47, at 185-87, 377-78.
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is only one part. Virtually all private universities consult student
representatives before taking major actions, and even curriculum over
the long run tends to reflect student preferences. 101 In short, students
are considered a constituent part of the academic community and
participate as such. Most importantly, if control over governance were
the essential ingredient in defining who is a member, then one might
expect some inquiry by the courts into the actual operation of the
associations or, in this instance, the universities. The courts have not,
however, concerned themselves with this issue in the private associa-
tion cases. Indeed, protection of individual members from the gov-
erning authorities is the raison d'etre of judicial intervention, even
where the members as a body have nominal ultimate control. Finally,
this objection is mechanistic. It would define "member" by reference
to facts largely irrelevant to the social desirability of protecting the
status interests that inure to students through attendance at univer-
sities. The formal characteristics of control over the governing author-
ities should not, therefore, serve to distinguish the relationship of a
student to the university from that of members of other private asso-
ciations.
III. Contours of the Property Right
Having demonstrated compelling reasons for protecting the student-
university relationship as "property," it now becomes important to
sketch the limits of that protection. It was once fashionable to speak
of property rights as absolute,'0 2 but such ideology surely is defunct
today.1 3 To consider for a moment the most obvious item of property,
land, it is immediately apparent that there are a number of major
constraints on its occupancy and use: zoning regulations, 04 conserva-
tion laws, 1°5 nuisance doctrine, 0 6 building code and health regula-
101. See id. at 186; cf. Platt & Parsons, Decisionmahing in the Academic System:
Influence and Power Exchange, in THE STATE OF THE UNIvERsITY: AUTHORITY AND
CHANGE 133 (C. Kruytbosch & S. Messinger eds. 1970).
102. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); M. COHEN, supra note 17, at 57-63.
103. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Phil-
brich, Changing Conceptions of Property in the Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938).
104. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Harbison
v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); Johnson, Con-
stitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 199 (1955).
105. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); State v. Goffstown,
100 N.H. 131, 121 A.2d 317 (1956); New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane,
61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972); cf. Note, Land Subdivision Control, 65 HARV. L. REv.
1226 (1952).
106. See, e.g., Meat Producer, Inc. v. McFarland, 476 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972); Wade v. Fuller, 12 Utah 2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961); Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d
490, 135 N.W.2d 250 (1965); Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TExAs L. REv. 399 (1942).
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tions.1° 7 Furthermore, in some circumstances one is forced to dispose
of the land to meet personal debts.' 08 In short, property rights in land
are defeasible in whole or in part when confronted with certain con-
ditions which represent the superiority of other societal interests. 09
The essence of the property protection is to protect an interest
from deprivation by a more powerful party purely on the basis of the
latter's superior power, without, however, making the owner absolute-
ly supreme so that he can with impunity manipulate his protected
interest to the detriment of others' property rights. Such protection
is built into common law property doctrine by requiring that any
deprivation be rationally justified, or by locating a presumption with
the owner so that anyone who would deprive the owner must satisfy
a burden of proof that his action is of overriding importance. 1 0
A student's property interest in his status might thus conflict with
certain arguable property rights of the university, based upon its
rights to manage its affairs and to assure orderly pursuit of its own
goals. The interests of the student and the university can be recon-
ciled by allowing the university to manage its own affairs up to the
point where it would defeat the student's legitimate valuable interest
in a purely arbitrary way. This would be accomplished by guaran-
teeing the student due process in expulsion proceedings.
More specifically, it would follow from this discussion that stu-
dents' property rights should be defeasible upon proof of conduct in-
consistent with the purposes of the private university. A student who
engages in a serious disruption of the university, for example, un-
reasonably infringes the university's rights and the rights of other
107. See, e.g., Jones v. District of Columbia, 323 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1963); American
Home Fire Assur. Co. v. Mid-West Enterprise Co., 189 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1951); De
Aryan v. Bultea, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954);
Lincoln Park v. Cullari, 15 N.J. Super. 210, 83 A.2d 233 (1951); Christopher, State
Police Power in Health and Fraud Matters, 8 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1963).
108. This would be involuntary bankruptcy. See J. MOORE & W. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS'
& CREDITORS' RIGHTS 1-14, 1-16 (1966).
109. Thus, economic expectations are, for example, not protected absolutely by the law
of tort but only against unreasonable injury or deprivation. They are, therefore, not
protected against competitive injury, because competition (everyone's right to use property
for his own benefit) is deemed more important to economic life than an absolute
security in economic expectations. Justice Holmes explained the defeasible nature of
property rights in this sense, responding to the contention that an individual's business
was being injured by union activity: -[T]he policy of allowing free competition jus-
tifies the intentional inflicting of temporal damage . . . when the damage is done
not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in
the battle of trade." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1087
(1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Expulsions from private associations are similarly pro-
tected, not absolutely, but only against unreasonable proceedings, not securing members
against expulsion, but only against expulsions based on procedures which evidence no
concern for the truth or respect for the member's interest in continued membership.
110. See Reich, supra note 14, at 771.
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students, since a measure of stability and order in the academic com-
munity is necessary in order for it to exist at all. As a second example,
if a student fails to achieve sufficient academic progress or achieves
such progress fraudulently by cheating, the very reasons for protecting
his relationship with the university are nullified. In general, the court
should, for reasons similar to those governing judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions,"" defer to the university's own definition of
what conduct is so inimical to the purposes of the particular institution
that expulsion is required. Substantive intervention into the govern-
ance of the university would, therefore, be limited to decisions or
formulations of policy which are arbitrary or capricious. This has
been the practice of courts in reviewing the expulsion decisions of
private associations.
1 2
Since the rationales for protecting the student's interest are based
largely on guarding against the external effects of discipline arbitrarily
imposed," 3 or against actions which effectively deny the student the
intrinsic educational benefits associated with the status of student,
the court's jurisdiction would be limited to those instances where
the sanction which the university imposes amounts to an effective
expulsion, in the sense that his pursuit of an education and an even-
tual diploma, to which his status entitles him, are substantially frus-
trated. Minor matters of discipline which do not significantly impede
Ill. The reasons for giving an agency primary jurisdiction include: uniformity of
decision, greater expertise in regard to investigation and determination of the relevant
facts, the exercise of administrative discretion allowing flexibility in application of
the law. See Far East Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441-46 (1907); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADNMINIsTRATIvE ACTION 123-34 (1965).
112. See, e.g., Local No. 57, Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944) (expulsion conclusive on civil court if association
acted in good faith and provided fair procedures); Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298,
308, 142 A.2d 798, 802 (1958) (equity is reluctant to enter internal affairs of private
association but will do so where an expulsion is arbitrary or not in accordance with
the association's rules); Junkins v. Local No. 6313, Communications Workers, 241 Mo.
App. 1029, 271 S.W.2d 71 (1954) (only on clearest showing that remedies within the
association are nonexistent or unreasonable will courts permit their jurisdiction to be
invoked; association's decisions not subject to collateral attack for mere error; courts
look to the record to determine whether proceedings were conducted within the
bylaws, in good faith, whether the charges were substantial and whether the member
had fair notice and an opportunity to be heard; court does not substitute its judgment
for that of the association); Pegg v. United Mnt. Life Ins. Co., 6 Misc. 2d 600, 601,
167 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (court will not substitute its judgment for that
of association if charges were substantial and member had fair hearing); Harmon v.
Matthews, 27 N.Y.S.2d 656, 664 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (court does not consider the weight
of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the association if member had
been accorded fair proceedings). For a university case employing this standard, avoiding
judicial interference with academic judgments unless arbitrary or unreasonable, see
Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474, 477, 333 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841-42 (Sup. Ct.
1971) (no abuse of discretion or gross error; no showing that denial was arbitrary,
capricious, or malicious).
113. See note 26 supra.
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the student's pursuit of his education and degree would not, therefore,
fall within the court's jurisdiction regardless of how unfair or un-
reasonable the punishment may be.
This approach to determining the limits of the courts' jurisdiction
was strikingly illustrated in Glynn v. Keele University,114 where the
student had not been expelled, but only "suspended" from the
premises for a few crucial weeks prior to examinations. The court
probed beneath the university's categorization and decided that the
action amounted to an effective expulsion since it made it impossible
for the student to complete preparation for his examinations. After
wrestling with the problem of the nature of the penalty imposed,
Vice Chancellor Pennycuick concluded
that those powers [to suspend from the premises] are so funda-
mental to the position of the student in the university . . . that
I do not think it would be right to treat those powers as matters
of internal discipline. 115
In another case, Woody v. Burns,"16 an American court pierced a
seemingly ministerial denial of late registration at a state school to
find that it was refused solely on the grounds of misconduct. Thus,
the denial was a veiled expulsion, and the court required due process.
The courts' jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to those cases in which
the student's right to pursue his education and degree has been vio-
lated-that is, where the school's action amounts to an effective expul-
sion. No precise formulation of this limitation can be constructed
since the facts of each case will vary, but the conceptual framework by
which the courts' jurisdiction should be judged-whether a de facto
expulsion has occurred-provides a manageable standard which can
be consistently applied. Broad areas of disciplinary actions which are
not effective expulsions, as well as the entire realm of grading, remain
properly outside the purview of the courts."
7
With effective expulsion as the jurisdictional criterion, and with
review limited to those expulsions which are clearly arbitrary or ca-
pricious, the court's major role is to guarantee students basic proce-
dural rights. This will not entail preventing expulsions if warranted.
If, for example, the school considers cheating or possession of heroin
114. [1971] 2 AlI E.R. 89.
115. Id. at 96.
116. 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
117. See, e.g., Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 936 (1970); Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1970); cf. Greenhill v. Bailey, 378 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.
Iowa 1974) (review of grades causing public school expulsion denied).
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inimical to university life (and nearly all universities would), then,
as long as basic procedural rights are followed, the only issues relevant
to the accused student's valuable interest in remaining a student are
whether he in fact committed the acts charged and whether expulsion
is an arbitrary or capricious punishment for the nature of the act
committed. If a hearing shows that he did commit the act, and the
university considers expulsion the proper remedy, it is then proper
to deprive the student of his status. If, on the other hand, he is ex-
pelled on the basis of a mere allegation without opportunity to chal-
lenge it, then no matter how serious the charge, his rights have been
violated.
Once the student's general right to procedural fairness in univer-
sity disciplinary proceedings has been established by the courts, the
precise contours of that right will be developed organically on the
basis of a growing body of case law. If the courts remain consistently
aware of the nature of the right being protected, the elements of the
required procedure can be tailored to the specific cases; the doctrine
can remain flexible. Since there already is, however, a body of law
which has developed a similar right for members of private associa-
tions, some basic requirements may be advanced with some confidence.
The defendant should, at the very least, have notice of the charges
against him and of the evidence upon which those charges are based,
including the names of any witnesses. He should have an unbiased
judging tribunal and the right to controvert the evidence used against
him, including the right to challenge, through reasonable means, the
veracity and credibility of witnesses.118 It is likely that such rights
may be substantially achieved without insisting upon an absolute right
to legal counsel or any particular format of cross-examination; the
spirit of due process, not the letter, should control." 9
118. See, e.g., Swital v. Real Estate Comm'r, 116 Cal. App. 2d 677, 679, 254 P.2d
587, 588-89 (1953) (due process includes notice, a hearing, and a fair trial); Harmon
v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (in expulsion proceedings a member
is entitled to have the charges made known to h.m, to be confronted by his accusers
and the witnesses against him, to a reasonable opportunity to question or cross-
examine them, to examine the evidence, and to answer, explain, defend and present
evidence in his own behalf). See also cases cited in notes 54-59 supra, and the state
action due process cases in note 2 supra; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
119. It may well be that the logic of the position advanced here should apply to
professors and instructors as well as students. Development of the common law in re-
gard to professors and instructors has suffered the same hiatus as the common law
in regard to students. See Cowan, Interference with Academic Freedom: The Pre-Natal
History of a Tort, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 205 (1958); Finken, Toward a Law of Academic
Status, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 575 (1973). The Fourteenth Amendment has provided limited
protection to professors and instructors. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Conclusion
The common law protects valuable interests of individuals and
groups from arbitrary deprivation or unreasonable injury if those
interests have enterprise-worth or are deemed inherently worthwhile
under the prevailing social ethic. Students at private universities have
an interest sufficiently valuable under these tests that the courts
should protect it against arbitrary deprivation. The law of private
associations already provides protection of members' rights in expul-
sion proceedings, but, with the exception of a few early cases, such
protection has not been extended to students, due at least in part to
an inadequate understanding of the fundamental nature of the inter-
ests at stake. Analysis of the basic rationales behind the law of prop-
erty not only provides a firmer foundation for the law of associations;
it also demonstrates why such protection applies with equal force to
the student-university relationship.
